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This qualitative study examines the influence of media development in Iraqi Kurdistan after nearly a decade and a half of donor country-funded professional journalism training in a period following an oil boom and bust, influence of a transnational terror organization, and a recent vote to secede from the rest of Iraq. The study builds out a typology of economic, political, bureaucratic, legal, cultural, and societal capture, and applies it in an analysis of data from in-depth, semi-structured interviews that were conducted in the two largest cities in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Government corruption and secrecy are not new phenomena in Africa; however, international scrutiny has grown as nations end decades of conflict and seek to develop, donor nations consider providing more aid, and investors and transnational corporations look to the area for oil and other resources. Given that corrupt government activities account for millions of dollars diverted from public coffers each year in developing nations and lead to unfair benefit distribution to citizens, the chapter examines the global network of actors attempting to advance the international norm of government accountability to constrain corruption through advocating for the adoption of access-to-information legislation. The chapter also explores the relationship between perception of corruption in Africa and four political institutions of vertical accountability. The findings indicate that perception of corruption is inversely correlated with news media rights, civil liberties, and political rights. However, adopting access-to-information legislation or planning to adopt the law was not correlated with the perception of corruption.

Opening this section's examination of current information policy is Patrice McDermott's analysis of Obama administration transparency initiatives, executive power, and continuing problems with federal agency Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) compliance. Of note is McDermott's discussion of the ambiguous Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) classification marking, which “is often defined differently from agency to agency, and agencies may impose different handling requirements. Some of these marking and handling procedures are not only inconsistent, but are contradictory.”¹

Government secrecy is often portrayed as antithetical to transparency¹ as well as an affront to the general right to know, citizen participation, administrative oversight, and democracy itself.² Furthermore, government secrecy is connected to “much broader questions regarding the structure and performance of democratic systems” (Galnoor, 1977, p. 278), and in instances, is “more dangerous to democracy than the practices they conceal” (Fulbright, 1971).³ This condition has led to what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1987) describes as a secrecy state, whichhas extended the secrecy system far beyond its legitimate bounds. In doing so, the target is far less to prevent the disclosure of information to enemy governments than to prevent the disclosure of information to the American Congress, press and people. For governments have discovered that secrecy is a source of power and an efficient way of covering up the embarrassments, blunders, follies and crimes of the ruling regime. (p. 5)